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INTRODUCTION 
Throughout most of the existence of the European Union (EU), 
state-owned monopolies have provided both local and long-distance 
telephone service in their respective Member States.! Pursuant to Direc-
tive 90/388 on telecommunications competition (Directive) adopted 
by the Commission of the European Communities (Commission) in 
1990, these monopolies must end in most Member States by 1998.2 
Liberalization of the telephone service market brings the hope of 
cheaper and more efficient service in the Member States, particularly 
for multinational businesses.3 Privatization and the liberalization ofthe 
EU internal telephone market also represent vast profit opportunities 
for internationally established telecommunications companies.4 
In response to mutual desires to maximize their positions in the 
newly emerging free market, global telecommunications companies 
and former state-owned monopolies (public telephone operators, or 
PTOs) have recently begun to form international partnerships.5 MCI 
and British Telecom (BT) formed a joint venture in June 1993, and 
the former German state monopoly, Deutsche Telekom, is in the proc-
ess of uniting with France Telecom.6 Sprint, Deutsche Telekom, and 
1 See, e.g., The Last One to the Draw, ECONOMIST, Aug. 13, 1994, at 55, 55 [hereinafter ECONO-
MIST]. 
2 Commission Directive 90/388 on Competition in the Markets for Telecommunications Serv-
ices, art. 2, 1990 OJ. (L 192) 10 [hereinafter Telecommunications Competition Directive]. While 
the Directive itself mandates the opening of the telephone market, the Commission set the 1998 
deadline subsequent to the passage of the Directive. See id.; ECONOMIST, supra note 1, at 55. 
3 Tanya Cordrey, Battle Lines, INT'L MGMT., May 1994, at 30, 30. 
4Id. 
S See Coopers & Lybrand, EC Commentaries, Telecommunications, Sept. 8, 1994, at *2.2, avail-
able in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Eurscp File [hereinafter Coopers & Lybrand, Telecommunications]. 
6 Monica Horten, Business Technology: Phone Companies Make Connections Over the Ocean, DAILY 
TELEGRAPH, Dec. 20, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; Cordrey, supra note 3, 
at 32. The joint venture between MCI and British Telecom is known as "Concert" and earned 
revenue of over one billion dollars in the past year. AT&T Defends World Partners Venture, 
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France Telecom are currently exploring a partnership geared towards 
multinational companies.7 Telecommunications giant AT&T followed 
suit by joining the Dutch, Swedish, and Swiss joint venture called 
Unisource.8 Earlier, AT&T considered the possibility of joining the 
possible Deutsche Telekom-France Telecom partnership.9 The pri-
mary goal of these partnerships is to win outsourcing contracts from 
multinationals based in the Member States; that is, to unilaterally 
provide global services to multinational companies. lO 
This Note discusses EU competition law with respect to international 
joint ventures in the telephone service market. Part I focuses on the 
foundation of EU antitrust law, articles 85, 86, and 90 of the Treaty of 
Rome, and reviews case law applying these articles. Part II examines 
the 1990 Commission Directive 90/388 and the steps the EU has taken 
to facilitate application of the Directive. Part III addresses the question 
of whether EU competition law would prevent a new monopoly con-
sisting of an international joint venture from forming in the phone 
service market in the wake of the dismantling of state-owned phone 
service monopolies. This Note concludes that the EU antitrust statu-
tory framework offers adequate protection against the perpetuation of 
a phone service monopoly. Because of a desire to upgrade service 
quality in the new internal market, coupled with a scarcity of common 
law applicable to phone service providers, however, the EU may need 
to take more specific action in the future to safeguard against monopoly. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Articles 85, 86, and 90 of the Treaty of Rome 
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome (Treaty Establishing the 
European Economic Community, or EEC Treaty) set forth the basic 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ALERT, Oct. 5, 1995, available in LEXlS, News Library, Curnws File [here-
inafter TELECOMMUNICATIONS ALERTJ. The alliance between Deutsche Telekom and France 
Telecom is called "Atlas". William Boston, U.S., European Telecoms Pact Confident of Approva~ 
REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REp., available in LEXlS, News Library, Curnws File. 
7 Boston, supra note 6; Mike Mills, Sprint May Sell Stake to European Giants, WASH. POST, June 
8, 1994, at F1. The tentative name for the alliance between Sprint, Deutsche Telekom, and France 
Telecom is "Phoenix". Boston, supra note 6. 
8 Tony Jackson, Survey of International Telecommunications, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1995, at VIII; 
Andrew Adonis, Best Form of Defence: A Look at the Competitive Pressures Leading to International 
Alliances, FIN. TIMES, June 16, 1994, at 21. The AT&T-Unisource joint venture is called "Uni-
world". Jackson, supra, at VIII. 
9 See Cordrey, supra note 3, at 32. 
10 See Coopers & Lybrand, Telecommunications, supra note 5, at *2.2. Outsourcing involves the 
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principles of EU antitrust lawY Article 85 prohibits agreements, deci-
sions, and concerted practices that aim to or, in fact, bring about 
restrictions on competition within the common market. I2 The article 
specifically targets activities such as price fixing and limiting or con-
trolling markets, production, and technical development. I3 Addition-
ally, a contract effectuating any of the restricted activities under article 
85 is considered null and void. I4 
The last section of article 85 qualifies the force of the prohibitions 
by stating that they may be inapplicable if the activity in question 
"contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or 
to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consum-
ers a fair share of the resulting benefit."15 The activities concerned must 
be justified as indispensable to such improvement or promotion by an 
undertaking. I6 Furthermore, the activities may not have the potential 
for eliminating competition "in respect of a substantial part of the 
products in question. "17 Thus, the plain language of article 85 provides 
some general competition guidelines with a broad exception justifYing 
a possible monopoly. 
Article 86 deals with the abuse by undertakings of a dominant posi-
tion in the internal market or in a substantial portion of it.IS Generally, 
article 86 cites the same examples of abuse as the prohibited activities 
set forth in article 85.19 In contrast with article 85, however, article 86 
focuses on prejudice to consumers in its prohibition of limits on markets, 
production, and technical development.2o Adopted in 1962, Council 
Regulation 17/62 provides the legal framework for enforcement by the 
Commission of both articles 85 and 86.21 
management and ownership of the telecommunications systems of multinational companies. 
Adonis, supra note 8, at 21. 
11 'TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC'TREATY] arts. 85, 86. 
12 [d. art. 85, para. 1. The agreements, decisions, and practices prohibited are ones "which may 
affect trade between Member States." [d. Article 85 is the first Rule Applying to Undertakings. 
[d. Although "undertaking" is not defined by the article, contextually it appears to have the broad 
meaning of "business organization" or "business entity." See id. 
13 [d. 
14 [d. para. 2. 
15 [d. para. 3. 
16 See EEC TREATY, supra note 11, art. 85, para. 3. 
17 [d. 
18 [d. art. 86. "Dominant position" is not defined in the article. [d. 
19 [d. arts. 85, 86. 
20 [d. 
21 Hans van Houtte, European Economic Community Antitrust Regulations Council Regulation No. 
17/62 and Commission Regulation No. 27/62, Basic Documents of Int'l Econ. L. (CCH), Intro-
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Article 90 applies only to public undertakings and, more specifically, 
to undertakings granted special or exclusive rights by Member States.22 
It prohibits Member States from enacting any measure contrary to 
other articles of the Treaty of Rome.23 Public undertakings that are 
monopolistic in nature fall within the scope of articles 85 and 86 as 
long as the competition rules do not inhibit the performance of tasks 
assigned to the undertakings.24 Additionally, article 90 provides the 
Commission with the power to legislate directives to ensure the appli-
cation of the article. 25 The Commission passed directives pursuant to 
article 90 in order to dismantle and control telecommunications mo-
nopolies.26 Member States objected to this use of the legislative provi-
sion of article 90, claiming that the provision unlawfully allows the 
Commission to issue a directive without conferring with the Council 
of Ministers.27 The Court of Justice of the European Communities 
(EC]) has consistently ruled in favor of the Commission, however, in 
suits brought by Member States against directives promulgated under 
article 90. 28 
B. Application of the Articles 
The Commission furnished guidelines in a 1991 Communication in 
order to clarify the application of the Treaty of Rome antitrust rules 
in the public and private telecommunications sectors.29 Additionally, 
the Commission hoped to foster the development of high quality, 
technologically advanced, inexpensive services and networks for Euro-
pean consumers.3D Although the guidelines did not create enforceable 
rights or affect the application of the articles by the EC], they gave 
examples of abuses of dominant positions by public and private under-
duction, at A. Article 87 enables the Council of Ministers to furnish a framework for the 
application of articles 85 and 86. Id. Council Regulation 17/62, the first product of this power, 
applies directly in the Member States. Id. 
22 EEC TREATY, supra note 11, art. 90, para. 1. "Public undertakings" are entities owned by a 
Member State. See id. 
23Id. 
24Id. para. 2. 
25Id. para. 3. 
26 See Coopers & Lybrand, Telecommunications, supra note 5, at *2.3. 
27Id. 
28Id. France lost a suit against the Commission in 1991 protesting the adoption of Directive 
88/301/EEC, which provides for the opening up of the terminal equipment market. Id. Spain, 
Belgium, and Italy lost a suit against the Commission in 1990 requesting the annulment of the 
Telecommunications Competition Directive. Id. 
29Id. 
30Id. 
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takings.31 The guidelines also provided for telecommunications opera-
tors to furnish complete interconnectivity between public networks in 
accordance with the articles.32 
The ECJ has provided significant insight into the antitrust articles. 
United Brands Co. and United Brands Continental B. V. v. Commission33 
clarifies the concept of relevant market and the criteria the Court uses 
to determine whether an undertaking possesses a dominant position 
in that market.34 The Court found that United Brands, an international 
grower, importer, and marketer of bananas, abused a dominant posi-
tion under article 86 by charging different prices to companies for 
equivalent transactions. 35 Although United Brands occupied a market 
position in several Member States, the Court focused on the competi-
tion-suppressing effects of the behavior of the undertaking in its mar-
ket rather than on the actual geographic scope of the market share.36 
In addition to holding that United Brands did not have to eliminate 
all competition in order to occupy a dominant position, the Court 
stated that simply being "in a position to impede effective competition 
on the relevant market" constituted a dominant position.37 
In Centre Belge D 'Etudes de Marche-Tele-Marketing SA v. Compagnie 
Luxembourgeoise de Telediffusion SA and Information Publicite Benelux 
SA,38 the Court applied article 86 to the detriment of a Luxembourg 
television station, RTL, that awarded an advertising contract to an 
31 Coopers & Lybrand, Telecommunications, supra note 5, at *2.3. Abuse of a dominant position 
for a public operator might consist of refusing to provide access to a network; for a private 
operator, refusing to supply interfaces. [d. 
32 [d. 
33 Case 27/76, United Brands Co. and United Brands Continental B.Y. v. Commission, 1978 
E.C.R. 207 (1978). 
34 [d. at 235-36, 238. 
35 [d. at 208-09. 
36 See id. at 235. In addition, the Court undercut the requirements in articles 85 and 86 that 
the activities affecting competition must "affect trade between Member States." EEC TREATY, 
supra note 11, arts. 85, 86; United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. at 208. If an undertaking in a dominant 
position, established in the internal market, tries to extinguish a competitor also established in 
the internal market, the relation of the behavior to trade between Member States is irrelevant as 
long as the elimination of the competition would have an effect in the common market. United 
Brands, 1978 E.C.R. at 208. 
37 United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. at 234; see also Case 6/72, Europemballage Corp. and Continental 
Can Co. Inc. v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 215 (1973). Continental Can states that "the strength-
ening of the position of an undertaking may be an abuse and prohibited under article 86 ... if 
it has the effect of substantially fettering competition." [d. at 217. In addition, "[a]rticle 86 is not 
only aimed at practices which may cause damage to consumers directly, but also at those which 
are detrimental to them through their impact on an effective competition structure .... " [d. 
38 Case 311/84, Centre Belge D'Etudes de Marche-Tele-Marketing SA v. Compagnie Luxem-
bourgeoise de Telediffusion SA and Information Publicite Benelux SA, 1985 E.C.R. 3261 (1985). 
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exclusive agent of RTL instead of to the plaintiff advertising agency.39 
In a preliminary ruling, the Court found that RTL occupied a dominant 
position in the tele-sales market and, despite the statutory authoriza-
tion of the monopoly, suggested that RTL abused this position by 
refusing to supply services to the plaintiff.4° The Court declared that 
the market share of the organization was a crucial factor in determining 
whether the undertaking had a dominant position subject to abuse.4l 
Although the Court did not define "market share" specifically, its 
constant references to the Belgian market implied that market share 
did not have to encompass the entire EU common market.42 Conse-
quently, the ECJ demonstrated its expansion of the application of 
article 86 antitrust principles to companies that occupy a dominant 
position in a domestic market only.43 
In Federation of Telephonic Equipment Manufacturers and Installers v. 
Telegraph and Telephone Authority,44 the Brussels commercial court held 
that the state telephone monopoly abused its dominant position under 
article 86.45 The court noted that an abuse of dominant position occurs 
when a company "reserves to itself or to an undertaking belonging to 
the same group, without any objective necessity, an ancillary activity 
which might be carried out by another undertaking. "46 Under the 
presumption of good faith in Belgian law, the court failed to find 
discrimination in the telephone monopoly's award of a supply contract 
to a manufacturer with which it already had a contractY Under article 
86, however, the supply contract unlawfully allowed the monopoly and 
the manufacturer to operate "independently of any competition. "48 
Without any apparent necessity, the telephone monopoly engaged in 
practices that would create additional costs for other manufacturers 
39Id. 
40 Id. The Court opined that "a monopoly protected by law represents one of clearest examples 
of a dominant position." Id. at 3265. 
41Id. at 3267. 
42 See id. at 3262, 3264, 3267, 3268. Another indication that "market share" does not mean 
"common market share" lies in the Court's statement that "an undertaking abuses its dominant 
position in the market if it uses that position to force its way into a neighboring market." Id. at 
3268. Logically, "market" could not mean the common market because EU antitrust law does not 
concern itself with the markets of neighboring nations. See id. 
43 See Centre Beige, 1985 E.C.R. at 3268. 
44 Federation of Telephonic Equip. Mfrs. and Installers v. Telegraph and Telephone Auth., 1990 
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who could have performed the services as well as the retained manu-
facturer. 49 
II. THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPETITION DIRECTIVE 
A. Provisions of the Directive 
Based on articles 85 and 86 and enabled by article 90, the Directive 
provides more specific guidance than the articles on phone service 
market competition.50 The Directive sets forth a program to progres-
sively introduce competition into the ED telecommunications mar-
ket.51 Because the primary aim of the Directive is to facilitate privatiza-
tion of the ownership of telecommunications companies, however, it 
does not provide much guidance regarding the possible subsequent 
formation of private monopolies in the new liberalized market.52 
Pursuant to the Directive, most Member States must liberalize their 
telephone markets by 1998.53 The Commission extended the deadline 
for Spain, Ireland, Greece, and Portugal until 2003.54 Recently, Spain 
announced plans to waive this extension in favor of the original dead-
line.55 In addition, several Member States have sped up the process of 
liberalization ahead of the 1998 deadline.56 
The Directive indicates that telecommunications organizations fall 
under the definition of undertakings for purposes of article 86.57 Ad-
ditionally, Member States must terminate grants of special or exclusive 
rights for supplying telecommunications services except in the field of 
49 See Federation, 1990 E.C.C. 193. 
50 EEC TREATY, supra note 11, arts. 85, 86, 90; Telecommunications Competition Directive, 
supra note 2; see also Coopers & Lybrand, TelRcommunications, supra note 5, at *2.4. 
51 Telecommunications Competition Directive, supra note 2, pmbl., para. 1. This program is 
the implementation of a proposal in the Commission's Green Paper on the development of the 
common market for telecommunications services and equipment. ld. 
52 See id.; see also Coopers & Lybrand, TelRcommunications, supra note 5, at *2.4. 
53 See Richard L. Hudson, Unisource Seeking Link in America, May Expand its Ties with AT&T 
Corp., WALL ST.]., Aug. 29,1994, at B6A; ECONOMIST, supra note 1, at 55. 
54 See Cordrey, supra note 3, at 30. 
55 Gail Edmondson & Tim Smart, Spain's Phone Giant Has Latin America Buzzing, Bus. WK., 
Sept. 12,1994, at 92,92. The chairman of Spain's PTO, Telefonica, stated that he would be willing 
to meet the original 1998 deadline because allowing market competition will permit Telefonica 
to enter new telecommunications businesses. ld.; see also ECONOMIST, supra note 1, at 56. 
56 See, e.g., ECONOMIST, supra note 1, at 56. For example, Britain privatized British Telecom in 
1984. ld. Italy planned to publicly offer shares in its state holding company by the end of 1994, 
and Deutsche Telekom will probably offer shares by 1996. Cordrey, supra note 3, at 30, 32. 
57 Telecommunications Competition Directive, supra note 2, pmbl., para. 13. 
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voice telephony. 58 If a Member State maintains exclusive or special 
rights for the provision and operation of public networks, it must 
ensure that access to the networks is non-discriminatory.59 Accordingly, 
operators requesting leased lines must be able to obtain them within 
a reasonable period.60 
B. Facilitation of the Directive 
The Commission created a competition directorate to investigate 
complaints about possible violations of the Directive or other antitrust 
rules. 61 The Commission noted an increasing number of complaints 
related to competition in its annual competition policy report issued 
in May, 1994.62 For example, BT filed a formal complaint with the 
competition directorate regarding the possible alliance of AT&T with 
Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom.63 As a result, the Commission 
is currently examining the Deutsche Telekom-France Telecom joint 
venture.64 
To supplement the enforcement of the Directive, the EU created an 
avenue for Member State telecommunications companies to confront 
possible anti-competitive activities of U.S.-based telecommunications 
companies.65 The former competition policy Commissioner signed an 
administrative antitrust agreement with the United States in Septem-
ber, 1991.66 Presumably applicable to former state-owned monopolies 
and to smaller, newly-emerging telecommunications companies in the 
Member States, the agreement established a formal procedure for 
exchanging information about possible violations of EU or U.S. com-
58 ld. art. 2. 
59 ld. art. 4. 
60 ld. The Directive also compels Member States to annually compile and transmit information 
concerning their respective applications of the Directive for three years after its adoption. ld. art. 
9. 
61 See Cordrey, supra note 3, at 33. 
62 See Coopers & Lybrand, EC Commentaries, Competition, Aug. 4, 1994, at *7.1, available in 
LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Eurscp File [hereinafter Coopers & Lybrand, Competition]. 
63 Cordrey, supra note 3, at 33. Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom ultimately eschewed an 
alliance with AT&T in favor of an alliance with Sprint. Eumpe Welcomes AT&T Breakup, DM NEWS, 
Sept. 25, 1995, at 1 [hereinafter DM NEWS]. In the United States, the Justice Department and 
the FCC have declined to approve Sprint's alliance with Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom 
because of a belief that European market liberalization has not progressed enough to permit 
entry into the U.S. market. ld. 
64 Cordrey, supra note 3, at 33. 
65 Coopers & Lybrand, Competition, supra note 62, at *7.2. 
66 ld. 
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petition rules.67 Although the actions taken or decisions rendered are 
not legally binding because the agreement is only administrative, the 
French government questioned the legality of the power of the Com-
mission to make such a broad agreement.68 
III. DISCUSSION 
Because the Directive has not taken effect yet, there is a paucity of 
resultant interpretive case law. Accordingly, the antitrust articles and 
applicable case law must be used to shed light on the Directive and to 
analyze alleged instances of monopoly. In a broad context, the appli-
cation of antitrust law to international joint ventures is not problem-
atic.69 As held by the EC] in Centre Belge, the provision of telephone 
service falls within article 86 as part of the definition of "trade".70 
Additionally, the Directive considers telecommunications organizations 
"undertakings" for purposes of article 86, thereby subjecting telephone 
service joint ventures to the jurisdiction of EU antitrust law.71 
Given the characteristics and existing partnerships of international 
telecommunications giants, a joint venture between one of these enti-
ties and a PTO has the potential to acquire a significant and perhaps 
dominant portion of the EU telephone service market.72 AT&T, which 
has already formed a powerful joint venture called "World Partners" 
with other nations, could assist a former PTO in retaining a domestic 
monopoly.73 AT&T would add technological innovation and a reputa-
tion for customer service to an existing dominant position of the PTO 
in the market of that Member State and, if applicable, in other Member 
States.74 The fear of such a comprehensive assembly of advantages in 
one joint venture prompted BT to file a complaint with the Commis-
67Id. The agreement enables either the EU or the U.S. to initiate an inquiry where it believes 
that anti-competitive activities in the territory of that party pose a threat to its respective interests. 
Id. The independence of each party's decisionmaking processes remains intact. Id. 
68Id. 
69 See Centre Beige, 1985 E.C.R. at 3266. The article 86 prohibition of abuse of dominant position 
in the common market stems from the desire to protect "trade between Member States." EEC 
TREATY, supra note 11, art. 86. 
70 Centre Belge, 1985 E.C.R. at 3266. 'Trade" is not defined by article 86 except that it applies 
to dealings between Member States. EEC TREATY, supra note 11, art. 86. 
71 Telecommunications Competition Directive, supra note 2, pmbl., para. 13. 
72 See Cordrey, supra note 3, at 32. 
73 See TELECOMMUNICATIONS ALERT, supra note 6. 
74 See Cordrey, supra note 3, at 33. Ironically, European PTOs avoided alliances with AT&T 
because of its large size, which PTOs feared would inhibit equality in a partnership. Jackson, supra 
note 8, at VIII. With the recent breakup of AT&T into three separate companies, AT&T is now 
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sion concerning the possibility of an AT&T alliance with Deutsche 
Telekom and France Telecom.75 The chairman of BT alleged that such 
an alliance with AT&T would forge the largest telecommunications 
monopoly in the world, let alone in Germany and France individually, 
thereby suppressing liberalization and improvement of services.76 
Even if PTOs prove unable to acquire a dominant position through-
out the EU common market, the prospect of retaining domestic mo-
nopolies remains.77 The concept of dominant position expressed in 
article 86 applies to the internal market "or a substantial part of it."7s 
Centre Beige and United Brands imply that a relevant market may consist 
of a discrete domestic market as well,79 Regardless of the relevant 
market, however, if PTOs convert from public to private monopolies 
and retain the potential for stifling competition, they will defeat the 
open market goals of the Directive.so Accordingly, domestic monopo-
lies as well as common market monopolies would violate EU antitrust 
law under the articles and under the Directive.S! 
The Directive may provide an effective deterrent to monopolies by 
permitting Member States to retain special or exclusive rights for 
networks, specifically the ownership of lines.s2 This provision acts as a 
preventative antitrust measure because a lack of control and ownership 
of certain facilities reduces the chance that a telecommunications 
company could, without economic necessity, reserve for itself or an-
other company an ancillary activity that could have been carried out 
by a third company.S3 According to entities like AT&T, however, this 
more streamlined and may be in a better position to offer its services in Europe. DM NEWS, supra 
note 63, at l. 
75 See Cordrey, supra note 3, at 33. 
761d. Ironically, BT seems to be headed in the direction of acquiring a dominant position in 
the common market in light of its alliance with Norwegian Telecom. See id. at 32. BT, which has 
been privatized since 1984, still controls 90% of the $23 billion telecommunications market in 
Britain. ECONOMIST, supra note I, at 56. In addition, BT has an alliance with MCI, another 
powerful international telecommunications company. Horten, supra note 6. 
77 See ECONOMIST, supra note I, at 55. 
78 EEC TREATY, supra note 11, art. 86. 
79 See generally Centre Belge, 1985 E.C.R. 3261; United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. 207. 
80 See Michele Balfour & Cameron Crise, A Privatization Test: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Poland, 17 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 84, 89 (1993). A detrimental "impact on an effective competition 
structure" can satisfY the requisite harm to consumers under article 86. Continental Can, 1973 
E.C.R. at 217. 
8! See generally Centre Belge, 1985 E.C.R. 326l. 
82 See Telecommunications Competition Directive, supra note 2, art. 4. 
83 See Federation, 1990 E.C.C. 193. A reservation of such an ancillary activity without objective 
necessity constitutes an abuse of dominant position. ld. 
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provision contradicts the spirit of liberalization and economic growth 
because it removes the ability of a company to establish its own facilities.84 
Ironically, the impending 1998 deadline for the liberalization of the 
telephone service market may trigger the development of new monop-
olies in conjunction with increased competition.85 Liberalization will 
shock PTOs who may not be cognizant of how to thrive or even subsist 
in a competitive market.86 In light of the convergence of other tele-
communications and information industries, state phone service mo-
nopolies must expand and make technological advances if they expect 
to survive in competition with diversified international telecommuni-
cations giants.87 The Directive does not provide any guidance, however, 
on how to accomplish this feat.88 Accordingly, from the perspective of 
the PTOs, international alliances may be essential for survival in the 
new global market.89 In asserting the necessity of France Telecom's 
joint venture with Deutsche Telekom, a spokesperson for France Tele-
com predicted that all EU telephone operators will be forced to create 
strategic alliances within the next ten years.90 Spain's waiver of its 
extension in favor of early liberalization is a testament to the attraction 
to and the competitiveness involved in forging international partner-
ships.91 
Under article 85, ajoint venture may be able to justifY the acquisition 
of a dominant position in the EU common market.92 The article 85 
prohibition on the restriction of competition does not apply if the 
activities of the company in question contribute to improved goods 
production or distribution or to the promotion of economic or tech-
nical progress.93 The innovations that international companies bring 
to partnerships with PTOs might qualifY under this exception because 
lower prices and strides in technology and customer service will benefit 
EU consumers.94 Thus, the sole issue in an antitrust case may be whether 
84 Cordrey, supra note 3, at 33. 
85 See Hudson, supra note 53, at B6A. 
86 Cordrey, supra note 3, at 33. 
87 Gail Edmondson, Brave Old World, Bus. WK./'THE INFO. REVOLUTION (spec. ed.), 1994, at 
42,43. 
88 See Telecommunications Competition Directive, supra note 2, pmbl. 
89 Cordrey, supra note 3, at 32. 
90 [d. 
91 ECONOMIST, supra note 1, at 56. 
92 See EEC TREATY, supra note 11, art. 85, para. 3. 
93 [d. 
94 See id. 
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the joint venture company abused its dominant position within the 
relevant market.95 
The primary aim of joint ventures is to win outsourcing contracts 
from multinationals, but it is unclear whether winning a dominant 
share of the multinational market would equate to a dominant share 
on a domestic market or on the overall common market.96 Accordingly, 
the formation of new monopolies may depend ultimately upon the 
amount of market share attributable to the business of multinational 
companies based in ED Member States.97 If current law proves to be 
ineffective in preventing abuses of dominant position, the Commission 
possesses the power to issue additional antitrust directives in further-
ance of the articles.98 Nevertheless, under current law, antitrust en-
forcement in the ED seems to be relatively active.99 The ED has the 
framework and potential for a successful future in preventing abuses 
of joint venture dominant positions. 
CONCLUSION 
Existing ED antitrust law is most likely adequate to prevent the 
perpetuation of a telephone service monopoly. The objectives of the 
Telecommunications Competition Directive-to privatize and liberal-
ize the telecommunications market-fully support the concept of com-
petition and should therefore trigger strict antitrust enforcement. On 
the other hand, the ED has a keen desire to upgrade the quality of 
telephone services, as evidenced by the first stated goal of the Directive: 
the improvement of telecommunications. As a result, the ED might be 
willing to overlook or tolerate monopolistic activity if an international 
joint venture provides the industry with significant technological or 
other service advances, thereby benefiting consumers. 
It remains to be seen whether alliances between PTOs and existing 
international operators have the potential for creating new monopolies 
95Id. art. 86. 
96 See Coopers & Lybrand, Telecommunications, supra note 5, at *2.2. 
97 See Centre Beige, 1985 E.C.R. at 3267. Ironically, smaller EU telephone service companies and 
PTOs that do not form joint ventures may have a chance at competing with joint ventures for 
the business of multinationals. See Adonis, supra note 8, at 21. Large companies are often 
reluctant to give full control of a strategic asset like telecommunications to one company and 
therefore end up avoiding outsourcing contracts. Id. 
98 EEC TREATY, supra note 11, art. 90, para. 3. EU case law also supports the right of the 
Commission to issue directives under article 90. See Coopers & Lybrand, Telecommunications, supra 
note 5, at *2.3. 
99 Shlomo, Maital, Antitrust Reborn, ACROSS THE BOARD, March 1994, at 44, 44. 
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in a domestic market or in the common market. Perhaps the biggest 
threat to competition will arise when PTOs of individual Member 
States-such as Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom-join together 
and subsequently form partnerships with international giants. In this 
scenario, individual PTOs can combine their market shares from mul-
tinational businesses, thereby bringing the partnership entity closer to 
a dominant position in a market. Simply possessing a dominant posi-
tion and seeking to strengthen this position may constitute an abuse 
violating antitrust law. As the body of case law interpreting antitrust 
law in the EU increases and develops, private telephone service provid-
ers will discover whether the EU will tolerate a possible new form of 
monopoly. 
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